
The textbook definition of philosophy almost always involves some mention of “critical analysis”. It is believed that to examine issues as they really are, and to disregard any answer that demands unquestionable obedience is to practise true philosophy.
The late philosopher, Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, named the ‘ultra-faithful’ believed this exactly: that philosophy with bias is not philosophy but a carefully structured set of thoughts about the world. Eze was able to display that all of known philosophy has elements of bias inherent in its midst. He was also (at least in this writer’s opinion) successful in arguing for African philosophy to be respected as a philosophical tradition.

The ultra-faithful position was found wanting by Eze, and not even Ward Jones, a successful philosopher in his own right, could preserve the ideals of this camp. However, there is a segment of the position which warrants thought – every philosophical project must be premised on critical analysis.If we were to take this segment to be true, what would that mean for the growing African philosophy? What implications would that have on its growth and future? How would we fashion the movement so as not to rob ourselves of its essence but also to place it according to strict philosophical standards?
To that, Kwasi Wiredu’s essay, “How Not To Compare African Thought With Western Thought” proved to be a useful text. In accordance with its title, Wiredu touched on the mistaken assumption that much of what we know about “traditional African society” is the entirety of what constitutes African thought, and therefore, African philosophy.

It is as if African philosophy must and should live and die by traditional tenets in order to be acknowledged. This is because it offers a certain exotic flavour to Europeans who still perceive Africa to be “a land where animals roam freely”. Of course, Wiredu turns that implication on its head. However, he does this by challenging our thoughts on what post-traditional African philosophy might look like.It is no secret that Africa was ravaged and destroyed by the advent of colonialism.
It imposed on us (as Africans) a way of life that was not ours to claim and freely enjoy. And in the wake of post-colonial society, the Africans’ first task was to remove influences of colonialism or “whiteness” in order to revert to a “purely African” way of life.To this day, we paint much of what we disagree with as ‘Eurocentric’ and unquestionably stick by our cultural tenets. This is understandable.
African culture is held in high regard, and it should. There are a lot of lessons that may be imparted from the acknowledgement and practise of culture. For example the Xhosa ritual of ukweluka, or the Venda tradition of domba, foster a kinship with fellow initiates as a clear coming-of-age arc is enacted through rituals.

Furthermore, it is understood that colonialism robbed Africans of the opportunity to shed their “folk thought” (unscientific, superstitious thought) organically. Thus, it was only inevitable that Africans would hoard their culture as something unfallible. In this, though, we fail to realise that there are elements that are.. well.. unscientific and superstitious. Or rather, we realise this but hang on nonetheless as a respite to Eurocentrism.
The flaw in all this?
We exalt culture to be above rational thought and analysis. “It is good because it is culture; it is culture because it is good.” We then imagine this very culture as the essence of our new project. We think of merely incorporating these cultural practices into academia and other spaces, and then labelling this all as “African philosophy”.We then run counter to the aims and goals of what we demand of philosophy: critical engagement and analysis.

Yet, Wiredu’s cry to Africans for us to examine all of what we call “culture”, preserve what is still of use, and disregard what is not – this is a cry that can only benefit African philosophy and its growth as a philosophical tradition.If a cultural belief does not “lead to a greater good or prevent a greater evil”, then it must be expunged.
Cultural expungement is not as simple as merely repealing legislation, sure. But if an ill such as ukuthwala was able to be shamed and shoved into the dark corners of our history (save the backwards individuals who will always exist), then what limits us from doing the same when it pertains to the practice of, say, ilobolo or ukukotiza?
It is the incorrect assumption, this writer believes, that rational thought is something exclusive to the Westerner. For as long as this assumption is inherent in the attitudes and actions of most African people, African philosophy will regress in one of two ways: it will either become a philosophy of superstition and myth therefore leading to intellectual disengagement.
It could also regress in that it becomes a philosophy born in lecture halls and conference rooms but having little to no effect where it should – in society, with the men and women of Africa.
Any set of ideas that are not examined in its entirety, no matter how noble the initial intention, devolve into the undoing of those who hold those ideas. Ask those who were part of the dying days of communism.Thus, a philosophical project embarked upon by Africans of all ages, classes and creeds will fashion a movement which can only enrich the level of discussion about the nature of life – all this, without even necessarily having to quote one European philosopher!
African philosophy has the ability to bring a perspective to the world that no white male philosopher could ever bring. The only obstacle is our level of critical engagement in truly constructing that perspective. After all, to paraphrase Eze’s infamous phrase, “human issues are, first and above all, African issues.
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